Semiparametric estimation and testing in models of adverse selection, with an aplication to environmental regulation by Lavergne, Pascal & Thomas, A.
Working Paper 97-77 
Statistics and Econometrics Series 28 
September 1997 
Departamento de Estadística y Econometría 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Calle Madrid, 126 
28903 Getafe (Spain) 
Fax (341) 624-9849 
SEMIPARAMETRIC ESTIMATION AND TESTING IN MODELS OF ADVERSE 
SELECTION, WITH AN APPLICA TION TO ENVIRONMENT AL REGULA TION. 
Pascal Lavergne and Alban Thomas· 
Abstract 
We propose a flexible framework for estimating and testing structural models with adverse 
selection. This framework uses semiparametric methods for estimating consistently structural 
parameters of interest and for assesssing the results by testing procedures. We consider a problem 
of environmental regulation where firms are regulated through contracts. We show how to check 
parametric assumptions for the abatement cost function and test for neglected adverse selection. 
We then apply a semiparametric procedure for estimating models with adverse selection, that does 
not require to specify the distribution of the private information and avoids costly numerical 
procedures. The proposed framework can prove useful in a wide variety of problems where 
adverse selection can be present. 
Keywords: 
Semiparametric estimation, specification testing, models of adverse selection, environmental 
regulation. 
* Lavergne, INRA-ESR, B.P. 27, 31326 Castanet-Tolosan Cedex, France. e-mail: 
lavergne@toulouse.inra.fr.; Thomas, INRA-ESR, e-mail: thomas@toulouse.inra.fr. Part ofthis 
work was done while the first author was visiting Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Financial 
support from the Eruopean Commission through research training grant ERBFMBICT961595 and 
from the French Water Agencies through research contract 2900A are gratefully acknowledged. 
Semipararnetric Estiruation and Testing 
in Models of Adverse Selection, 
with an Application to Environrnental Regulation 
Pascal Lavergne and Alban Thomas 
1 Introduction 
The economics of information and incentives has experienced great developments in recent years. 
In particular, the design of contracting procedures has been the subject of a vast literature, see 
the monograph of Laffont and Tirale (1994) for references. In the economic theory of contracts, 
the agent is characterized by a prívate information which determines his ultimate actions. Two 
possible sources of asymmetric information can be distinguished : (a) an unobservable action 
undertaken by the agent (effort in a production process, protection against risk, ... ); (b) an 
unknown characteristic of the agent (efficiency in terms of cost, willingness to pay for a given 
good, ... ). Case (b) is labelled adverse selection in the literature, and the agent's characteristic 
is referred to as his type. While the type of the agent is unknown to the principal, the latter 
nevertheless is assumed to have prior information before the contract is negociated, in terms 
of the statistical distribution of the type and other relevant characteristics of the agent. The 
challenge for the principal is to set up a contract scheme enforcing truthful revelation of the 
private information. thus allowing some optimal solution to be attained for the econornlc variable 
of interest (production level, environmental externality, ... ). 
In practice, contracts are largely used in domains as various as environmental regulation, 
industrial relationships, agricultural production or employment procedures. This suggests that 
asymmetric information, and in particular adverse selection, is present in many situations and 
that this must be investigated when analysing empirical data. Moreover, it is likely that neglect-
ing the issue of imperfect information would lead to unreliable results. However, many prablems 
arise for the econometrician when taking into account adverse selection. First, many features of 
the model are unobservable : private information is unobserved by both the principal and the 
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econometrician, while prior information of the principal is also unknown to the econometrician. 
Second, and because of this, the distribution of the type itself is to be estimated jointly with 
other structural parameters. Third, such theoretical models lead to econometric ones that are 
highly nonlinear with unobservable (latent) variables, and possibly incorporating a truncation 
condition in cases where only a fraction of the agents is contracting. Hence, estimation oí models 
with adverse selection generally requires sophisticated and costly numerical procedures, such as 
direct numerical integration or simuiation-based methods (see Laffont, Ossard and Vuong, 1995, 
for an application to auctions). These empirical difficulties explain that much applied work is 
based on reduced-form models (e.g. Chiappori and Salanié, 1997; Dalen and Gomez-Lobo, 1997; 
Gasmi, Laffont and Sharkey, 1997) and that only a few econometric applications of the theory is 
based on structural models (Ivaldi and Martimort, 1994; Mi ravette , 1997; Thomas, 1995; Wolak, 
1994). Nevertheless, it remains that ignorance of the true distribution function for the agent's 
type can be an important source of misspecification errors, whose impact is difficult to assess. 
The purpose of this paper is to propose a flexible framework for estimating and testing 
structural models with adverse selection. This framework uses semiparametric methods for es-
timating consistently parameters of interest and for assessing the results by testing procedures. 
The advantages are twofold. First, from an estimation viewpoint, a semiparametric model allows 
to let the distribution of the agents' type unspecified, so that robust estimates can be obtained. 
Moreover, the estimation does not require costly numerical algorithms to be used. Second, from 
a testing viewpoint, tests relying on nonparametric methods are consistent against any alter-
native and then can detect misspecifications that are not uncovered by standard parametric 
tests, as will be seen in our application. In addition, when the objective function of the agent 
is separable in the observable and unobservable variables, it is quite easy to entertain a test for 
neglected asymmetric information without requiring parameterization of the asymmetric infor-
mation part of the model. Furthermore, it is possible to test maintained parametric assumption 
that determines the estimation of structural parameters. 
More specifically, we consider a problem of environmental regulation. Section 2 describes 
a simple model with adverse selection, where the principal is a local environment protection 
agency, and the agent is a polluting firm whose efHuent emissions are to be reduced. In this 
case, the source of asyrnmetry lies in a private-information parameter refiecting the efficiency 
of the firm in abatement activity. In Section 3, we present the econometric models jointly with 
the estimation and testing procedures. In Section 4, we apply our econometric framework to 
a sample of French industrials for the period 1985-1992. We believe that the structure of the 
economic model and the econometric procedures for estimating the structural parameters and 
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testing the competing models are mode widely applicable to many reg,ulation situations with 
adverse selection. As will be seen, the basic requirement is that the effects oí the agent's type 
and oí the other variables on his profit could be separated. 
2 Environmental Regulation with Asyrnmetric Information 
2.1 The Basic Abatement Model 
Let us consider a fum whose production generates some effiuent emission level, denoted B. The 
fum is able to reduce its emission level by investing in an abatement capital stock, K. In that 
case, the operating cost of the abatement plant depends on the incoming emission fiow B, on the 
pollution abatement rate (percentage of reduced emissions) 8, and on an efficiency parameter 
(J. Let C((J, B, 8) denote the operating abatement costo The outcoming (net) emission level is 
equal to (1- 8)B. The regulator is a local environment protection agency, designing an emission 
charge scheme and g,ranting subsidies to support the firm's abatement activity. Note that the 
emission tax is based on actual effiuent emissions (1 - 8)B, Le. after possible abatement, and 
that subsidies may not be systematica11y granted, depending on the regulatory policy adopted. 
Let t and T( ()) respectively denote the unit emission charge and the transfer from the regulator 
to the fum that may depend on its efficiency parameter. The profit of the firm is 
pQ - d(Q) - t(l - 8)B - C(O, B, 8) - K + T((}) 
where Q is the output level, p is output price and d(Q) is the production costo The price of 
capital is normalized to 1. \:Ve as sume that production and abatement activities are separable, 
so that production output level Q and effiuent emission B are fixed when considering abatement 
decisions. 1 Therefore, profit in the abatement activity can be written 
II(B, 8, T(B)) = t8E - C(B, B, 8) - K + T(B), (1) 
because a11 predetermined terms depending only on Q and B can be dropped. Hence, the fum 
receives a positive amount t8B from the regulator, when abating the emission level B by 100 X 8 
percent, plus a transfer T(B) depending only on its efficiency parameter. The abatement cost 
function C(B, B, 8) is assumed to be increasing and convex in 8, increasing in B but decreasing 
lThis assumption is justified by the fact that t is low compared to marginal profit from production. Further-
more, we deal here with external (end-of-pipe) abatement, and not clean technologies, for which production and 
abatement activities are technically entangled. 
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in parameter O. Hence, for a g,iven level of emission and a given abatement rate, a firm with a 
higher parameter O will be more efficient. 
In our application, the abatement cost function is chosen as a Cobb-Douglas fl.mction, 
l.e. 
(2) 
where e > O is a scale parameter, f3 < O, ao > O, and al > 1 to ensure convexity of the cost 
function. 
2.2 No Regulation 
When it is not regulated (Le. T(·) == O), the firm will select the abatement rate by maximizing 
profit in Equation (1) with respect to ó. This yields the status quo solution: 
1 log~ = {-log(cad + logt - (ao -1) 10gB - f3log0}. 
al - 1 
(3) 
With the aboye conditions on parameters, it is easily seen that abatement rate is increasing in 
the emission charge t and the efficiency parameter G. Note also that it is increasing in emission 
level E, when there are increasing returns to scale in abatement (Le. ao is les s than 1). 
In the theory o[ environmental reg,ulation, the so-called Pigouvian tax, which is equal 
to marginal utility of consumers [or abatement, achieves the socially-optirnal rate of abatement. 
\Vhere firms are [aced with the Pigouvian tax, they fully internalize the social cost of environ-
mental damages caused by their pollution. This is known as the Polluter-Payerprinciple. But in 
practice the emission charge can be restricted [or practical and institutional reasons. For exam-
pIe, during the 1980's in France, anti-inftationary measures imposed a virtually null growth rate 
for the unit emission tax in constant terms. Furthermore, local environment protection agencies 
("\Vater Agencies") did not consider the emission charge a truly incentive-based policy instru-
ment, but rather a limited financial compensation for water use and deterioration (see Thomas, 
1995). Another reason worth mentioning is the difficulty for the regulator to evaluate properly 
the social utility function for abatement or, equivalently, the social disutility function for pol-
lution. \Vhen consumers' preferences towards pollution are not known with sufficient accuracy, 
then the regulator may not be able to design the proper Pigouvian tax scheme (see Baumol 
and Oates, 1988). As a result, firms facing a uniform emission charge will not find it profitable 
to abate at a "socially-acceptable" rate, because of the discrepancy between marginal cost of 
abatement and marginal benefit from abatement. 
The problem is complicated further because uniformity of the emÍssion tax does not 
allow [or optimal policies to be achieved in practice. This is because distortions are likely to 
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be important when considering heterogenous polluters, characterized by different efficiency pa-
rameters. Theoretically, this could be overcome by letting the tax t depending on e. However, 
in most real-world environmental policies, the emission charge is in fact uniform, mainly for 
ease of implementation and equity grounds. Hence, it is often not possible for the regulator to 
implement a personalized, firm-specific emission charge. 
It is then clear that more flexible policies are called for. A complementary environmental 
policy instrument which is often used in practice is a contract scheme between the local regulator 
and the fum; according to this contract, the firm accepts to invest in a treatment plant in order 
to abate at a given rate, while receiving a transfer T(O). The contract-based regulation policy 
allows for a case-by-case determination of abatement rate (and other possible variables of interest 
to the regulator) consistent with standard reg,ulatory and juridical procedures. It is therefore 
interesting as a complementary or alternative policy to the uniform emission charge regulation. 
As we will see below, the actual performance of contract schemes crucially depends on the ability 
for the regulator to observe firm's characteristics which are likely to affect the abatement activity 
(Xepapadeas, 1991; Baron, 1985). 
2.3 Regulation under Perfect Information 
In the contract-based regulation of the firm, the reg,ulator is assumed to maximize total surplus, 
i.e. for consumers and the firm, with respect to abatement level, 8B. The reg,ulator preferences 
are summarized in a parameter (J, used as a weight in the surplus function. High values for this 
parameter indicate that the regulator favors consumers more than the fum. Following Baron 
(1989), this weight must be in the interval [0.5,lJ for the problem to be consistent2 . The con-
sumers' utility function for abated pollution is denoted W(.), with lV' > 0, W" ~ O. The 
contract between the regulator and the firm consists in the pair (8(0), T( e)), where T( O) is the 
subsidy granted to the firmo Total surplus then reads 
(J [W(B8(O)) - tB8(0) - T(O)] + (1 - (J) [tB8(O) - C(O, B, 8 (e)) - K + T (O)] , 
where it is implicitely assumed that consumers' surplus and the regulator's budget can be ag-
gregated. Both transfer T(O) and the amount paid to the firm for abatement, tB8(e), must be 
paid by consumers through some redistribution (fiscal) mechanism. 
Two conditions must be met by the regulation mechanism. First, the abatement rate 8* 
must be greater than in the status qua for the regulation to be effective. Second, for the fum 
2lt can be shown by a somewhat different exposition of the regulator's problem that values of CT less than 0.5 
correspond to a negative opportunity cost of public funds. 
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to accept to participate in the contract relationship, its profit under regulation must be greater 
than its status qua profit, Le. we must have II(0,8*(0)) ~ II(0,80). This condition is denoted 
Individual Ratianality in the literature. Using the definition (1) of the profit, total surplus can 
be rewritten 
u [W(B8(0)) - C(O, B, 8(0)) - K] + (1 - 2u)II(0, 8(0), T(O)). 
Under perfect information, Le. when the regulator knows the value of parameter O, the problem 
is simplified by the fact that the principal is able, through the transfer, to exactly equate both 
regulation and status qua profits. Hence, the second term in total surplus can be omitted and 
maximizing with respect to the abatement rate yields: 
W'(B8* (O))B = BC(0':8 8*(0)). 
The First-Best (perfect information) solution equates marginal utility and marginal cost of 
abatement. This is the standard result of Pigouvian taxation. But as argued aboye, it is likely 
that the actual rate is lower than the optimallevel. Hence if we as sume that the marginal utility 
for abatement is constant, and proportional to the actual emission charge t, we can write 
W'e) = t* == el é> 1. 
The parameter é reflects the imperfection in the uniform emission tax scheme. \Vith our choice 
of the cost function, the First-Best optimal abatement rate is, in logarithmic form, 
log8* = 1 {lOg(é/CÜI) + logt - (ao - 1) log B - plogO}. 
al - 1 
(4) 
Because é > 1, the First-Best abatement rate 8* is always greater than in the status qua. 
2.4 Regulation under Asymmetric Information 
\Ve now consider the case where the principal does not observe the agent's efficiency parameter 
O. In theory, the contracting procedure is modelled as fo11ows. First, the firm is asked to report 
its prívate information, Le. its efficiency parameter. Based on the reported e, the regulator then 
proposes a contract, Le. a pair (8(e), T(e)), that the firm can accept or noto Nevertheless, in 
practice it is not necessary to require the agent to reveal his type directly. The regulator offers 
a menu of contracts to the agent who, assuming the contracting scheme is properly designed, 
selects the contract corresponding to his type. 
Obviously, the contracting scheme has to satisfy the participation constraint previously 
described, namely that profit under regulation has to be greater than or equal to the status 
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qua profit. Moreover, another constraint is relative to the revelating property of the contract 
scheme. The regulator is willing to enforce truthful reporting of characteristic o by the fum, in 
order to avoid strategic behavior. Indeed, as the contract is indexed on the reported parameter 
0, a fum with a "good type" (i.e. a high efficiency parameter O) may report itself as a "bad 
type." In so doing, the fum may be assigned a reasonable objective in terms of abatement, while 
receiving a more profitable lumpsum transfer. The constraint associated to truthful revelation 
is denoted Incentive Compatibility in the literature. It states that the firm must be better off 
when reporting the true type value, as it is when reporting any other value. A major difference 
with the First-Best solution is that now the regulator has to grant an information rent to the 
fum in retum for its truthful reporto Such a rent is supported by the transfer T(-); because of 
the cost of public funds, the reg,ulator may experience a Sig,1lÍficant financial burden for this. 
Therefore, the regulator is not able to implement the First-Best solution and in particular 
is unable to determine the transfer which would achieve equality between profits under status quo 
and regulation. He has nevertheless prior information on the firm's characteristic, which enables 
him to maximize total surplus cx ante, over the definition domain for O. Such information 
is available to the principal through past contracts with similar firms, or technical data on 
abatement activity on a sector-by-sector basis. Prior information to the regulator is traditionally 
represented by a probability distribution function F(O) with associated density function feO), 
defined on the domain [Q, ej. Total expected surplus then reads 
max ! {O" [W(B8(0)) - C(O, B, 8(0)) - gj + (1- 20"}n(0, 8(0), T(O))} f(O)dO. (5) 
The menu of contracts (8**(-), T(-)) is chosen so as to maximize (5), taking into account the 
three constraints 
IT(O, 8(0), T(O)) 2: neO, 8(0), T(O)) VO, [) (Incentive Compatibility), (6) 
neO, 8(0), T(O)) 2: neo, 8°, O) V O (Individual Rationality), (7) 
and 
(Increased Abatement), (8) 
where O is the true parameter value and O is the report of the type by the firmo As shown in the 
Appendix, the equilibrium solution under asymmetric information is given by: 
10g8** = { a/-1 {10g(cjccx1) + logt - (ao - 1) log B - H(O)} for O 2: Oc, (9) 
a1
1
_1 {-10g(CCX1) + logt - (ao -1) 10gB - ¡310g0} for O < Oc, 
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where 
[ 
20- - 1 1 - F( O) 1] 
H(O) = -,BlogO + log 1-,B o- feO) O ' (10) 
and Oc is the solution to 
(11) 
Only firms with efficiency parameter greater than Oc will be regulated by means of con-
tracts. This comes from two competing effects. On the one hand, it is socially more profitable to 
regulate efficient firms so as to promote overall emission reduction. On the other hand, it is more 
costly to regulate efficient firms since the information rent is increasing in O (see Appendix). 
The principal therefore concentrates only upon a fringe of firms aboye the threshold value Oc, 
so as to reduce overall information rents. Interestingly, the threshold value crucially depends on 
the discrepancy between the Pigouvian tax level and the actual emission charge. In other words, 
when the inefficiency in the emission tax system is important, the threshold value Oc decreases, 
and more firms are regulated (see Thomas, 1995, for a similar result). On the other hand, firms 
below the threshold value will not be regulated, and will be left. at the status qua level, namely 
they will be characterized by the abatement rate 81 defined in Equation (3). Figure 1 presents 
the different solutions for the abatement rate in function of parameter O. It is easily seen that 
the abatement rate solutions can be ranked as follows: 8**(0) ~ 8*(0)\10, 81(0) ~ 8*(0)\10 and 
8**(0) 281(0) for O 2 Oc' 
3 Estimation and Testing 
3.1 Estimation of the Competing l\1odels 
The perfect information solution is theoretically characterized by the equation 
log8 = X' A + ,Blog(O), 
where X = (l,logt,logB), and (A,,B) are structural parameters. However, the efficiency param-
eters are unknown to the practitioner. As usual in econometrics, we consider that we have at 
hand sorne observable variables lV related to O through a lmown parameterized function k(·,,). 
Then we consider 
E [log8IX, lV] - X' A +,BE [logOIW] 
X' A + ,Bk(lV, ,). 
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Hence, we get the perfect information econometric model 
log8 = X'A + ,6k(W,,) + u, E[UIX, W] = o. (12) 
Note that all parameters may not be indentified, and specifically we may not be able to get 
separate estimates of ,6 and,. 
The asyrnmetric information solution is theoretically characterized by Equation (9). For 
using this formula for econometric estimation, we must take into account that under adverse 
selection we observe only industrials that contract with the agency. Therefore, we consider 
Ee[log8le ~ ee, X, W] - X'A + E {1:oo H(e) 1 !~~ee) delw} 
X'A + g(W). 
From its definition, the function g(.) is generally a highly non-linear function. Moreover, even if 
we model e through a known function of some explanatory variables ~V, gO remains unknown, 
as H(e) depends not only on e, but on the whole unknown distribution function of the firms' 
types FO. Previous work deals with this problem by specifying a particular form for F(·) and 
deriving the corresponding g(.), whose parameters are subsequently estimated by numerical 
algorithms. In this work, we let the types' distribution, and then the function g(.) unspecified, 
and we apply a semiparainetric procedure for estimating the parameters A. Specifically, we use 
the semiparametric estimation procedure proposed by Robinson (1988), that we briefiy recall. 
Our econometric model writes 
log8 = X'A + g(W) + \1, E[\fIX, W] = o. (13) 
By taking conditional expectation with respect to 1V, we get 
g(W) = E[log 6IW]- E[X'IW]A 
and by difference of the two previous equations, we end up with 
log6 - E[log6/W] = [X - E(X/W)]' A + V. 
The estimation procedure consists in inserting nonparametric (kernel) estimates En [log 81W] 
and En[X¡W] in place of the unknown conditional expectations and estimating A by a standard 
no-intercept OLS rule. The resulting parameter estimate :x is consistent and asymptotically 
normally distributed with a .Jñ rate of convergence. Moreover Robinson (1989) suggests use of 
~ to form estimators of g(.) as En [log 6IW]- En[X'IW¡:X. 
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3.2 Testing for Asymmetric Information 
The two assumptions that the specification of the cost function implies separation between the 
influence of the type and of other factors and that log( O) can be approximated through a known 
function of observable variables allows for a simple test of asymmetric information. Indeed, from 
the two theoretical models of Section 2, we have built two competing econometric models 
{ 
log8 = X'), + k(W, 'Y) + U (Perfect Information), 
log 8 = X' ), + g(W) + V (Adverse Selection). 
Therefore, in our setting, the perfect information model corresponds to the asymmetric informa-
tion model in which the unknown function g(.) equals k(·, 'Y) for sorne value of 'Y. One possibility 
for testing for neglected asymmetric information could be to entertain a test of equality of g(.) 
and k(·, 'Y), based on nonparametric and parametric estimators respectively. Another one could 
be to compare estimators of ), in the two models through a Hausman-type test. A third solution 
is simply to test if the conditional expectation of the residual is zero in the perfect information 
model. The advantage of this method is threefold. First, we need only to estimate the simpler 
model. Second, the testing procedure will be robust against possible misspecifications of the 
parametric part of the model. Third, this procedure is applicable in other problems where the 
parametric assumptions on the function of interest (cost functions, production functions, ... ) 
are different. 
Several procedures for testing a parametric specification against a nonparametric one 
exist in the literature. In the sequel, we will use the one developped by Zheng (1996), which 
is implemented as follows. First we compute residuals {Ji from the parametric model of perfect 
information. Then we compute the statistic 
where h is a bandwidth, p is the dimension of (X, Hl) and K(·,·) is a kernel from IRF to IR . 
Under the null hypothesis 
Ho : E[U¡X, TV] = 0, 
the statistic Vn is such that nhP/2Vn~N(O, w2). Under any alternative to the null, i.e. under 
any misspecification of the parametric regression model, nhP/ 2Vn ~ + oo. Hence a one-sided 
normal test can be based on nhP/ 2Vn /wn , where w~ is a consistent estimator of w2 , see Zheng 
(1996) for details. 
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3.3 Testing for Parametric Specification 
The separation between the type () and other factors in the profit function is central for our 
analysis. This hypothesis, together with the specification of the cost function, allows estimation 
of structural parameters of interest. Moreover, we may reject the whole perfect information 
model only because of misspecification of the parametric cost function. Therefore, it seems 
important to check if the parametric specification of the economic model is acceptable in view of 
the evidence provided by the data. In our analysis, this is the Cobb-Douglas specification that 
entails separability. Moreover, it implies that the expectation of log 8 is linear in log t and log B, 
either in the perfect information model or in the adverse selection one. To check this linearity, 
we apply the nonparametric conditional moment test developped by Delgado, Dominguez and 
Lavergne (1997), which is an extension of Zheng's test. From the residuals (ji (of either the 
parametric or the semiparametric model), we can compute 
where h is a bandwidth, q is the dimension of X and L(·) is a kernel from JRq to JR . This 
statistic has a behavior similar to Vn , i.e. nhP/ 2V; ~N(O, w*2) under the null hypothesis 
Ha : E[UIX] = 0, 
and nhP/ 2V; ~ + 00 under any alternative. As before, a one-sided normal test is built upon 
nhP/2V;' /w~, where w~2 is a consistent estimator of w*2, see Delgado, Dominguez and Lavergne 
(1997) for details. 
3.4 Computing P-values 
It is now well-known that for tests such as Zheng's one, the asymptotic normal approximation 
does not provide an adequate approximation for usual sample sizes. The test statistic behaves 
like a centered and rescaled chi-square with deg,Tees of freedom converging to infinity, in an 
asymptotic sense, and accordingly the finite sample distribution is typically right-skewed. Hence, 
in testing for asymmetric information and separability, it can be misleading to use p-values 
coming from the asymptotic normal approximations. 
Two solutions can be thought of. A wild bootstrap procedure, such as studied by Hardle 
and Mammen (1993) and Li and Wang (1995), can be applied to compute more accurate p-values. 
This roughly comes to generate residuals from a distribution that has the same conditional third 
moments than the residuals from the (parametric or semiparametric) model under test, and then 
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to recover a bootstrap sample by adding the estimated parametric function to these generated 
residuals. This method is used in testing for asymmetric information. 
Unfortunately, we cannot apply wild bootstrap in testing for parametric specification. 
Indeed, we are testing for the nullity of a conditional expectation involving only part of the 
explanatory variables, Le. only X. In this case, a bootstrap procedure would need to generate 
values of W that mimic the dependence with the other variables, which is not possible in our 
framework. Instead, we use an approximation based on a centered-rescaled chi-square with de-
grees offreedom estimated from the data, as proposed by Chen (1994) and Lavergne and Vuong 
(1995) in different contexts. 
4 Empirical Application 
4.1 Data Description 
We use plant--Ievel data on abatement activity of industrials located in three French hydrograph-
ical basins: Adour-Garonne (Southwest), Rhin--Meuse (Northeast) and Seine-Normandie (Paris 
and North). The number of observations is :320 and the sarnple period is 1985-1992. Contracts are 
recorded between industrials and local \Vater Agencies, concerning external abatement plants 
only. This is because they do not rnodify the production process and allow to recover abaternent 
variables, which would not be possible with internal abatement. An industrial is represented 
only once in the sarnple, so that our static frarnework can be applied to this set of data. There 
are sorne cases in which the contract covers several successive operations, rnostly because of the 
technical complexity and the high construction cost of the abatement planto Abatement rates 
are then computed after complete setting up of the plant, taking into account the one-year delay 
for the equiprnent to become fully operative. 
Effiuent emission data are available on five categories of pollutants: Biological Oxygen 
Oemand (BOO), Total Suspended Solids, Nitrogen, Phosphates, and Inhibitory Matters. We 
choose BOO as the pollution index, as it is good indicator for overall pollution, accounting for 
more than 75% of total emission fees3 . B is then defined as the gross (Le. before treatment) 
emission level, in kg per day. In the following, the level of ernission B, the abatement rate 8, and 
the unit emission charge t will therefore correspond to BOO. 
There exist three possible steps in wastewater abaternent. The first step, denoted primary 
3BOD is a conventional, degradable pollutant defined as the quantity of oxygen absorbed by the effiuent, 
measured on a 5-day period at a temperature of 20°C. BOD is a good measure of microbiological activity, 
particularly when the effiuent is severely polluted. See McConnell and Schwarz (1992) for details. 
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treatment, deals with organic matters essentially, while secondary and tertiary treatments are 
required when effiuents are more complex in nature. A firm will be more efficient in the abate-
ment activity when effiuents can be abated with primary treatment only. Considering exogenous 
variables entering the conditional expectation of 10g(O), we select an indicator of organicity of 
effiuent emissions, denoted PART, with PART E [0,1]. A value of that index close to one indi-
cates that effiuents are mostly organic, and therefore require limited additional treatment, hence 
reducing the cost of abatement. The motivation for this choice is that abatement of BOO is likely 
to be more difficult, and hence will require more know-how and ability from the industrial, when 
that effiuent comes jointly with other, more toxic pollutants. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for variables in the sample. Variability in the 
unit emission charge originates both fram yearly variation and from regional differences in the 
design of the emission fees. 4 Additional exogenous variables are needed as instruments in the IV 
procedure: as candidates, we use dummy variables for the industry sector of the firm (SIC). The 
definition of the sectors is the following, with the number of firms in each sector: COD1: Food 
and drinks (73 firms); COD2: Oairy products (50 firms); COD3: Chemicals (41 firms); COD4: 
Iron and steel (103 firms); COD5: Paper and wood (:36 firms). 
4.2 Estimation and Testing of the Perfect Information Model 
Two versions of the model (12) corresponding to different forms of k(·, ,) are estimated. Model 
1 assumes that the conditional expectation of log(O) is linear in 10g(PART); in Model 1I, the 
expectation of log(O) is linear in P ART. In a preliminary step, we check for exogeneity of B and 
do not reject this hypothesis. Hence this validates our assumption of separability between pro-
duction and abatement (see Section 2.1). VVe subsequently consider models in which 10gPART 
and P ART are possibly endogeneous, so as to take into account possible misspecifications due 
for instance to omission of variables. Instrumental Variable estimation results based on the set 
(X, COD1, COD2) are presented in Table 2, for both model specifications. From Pesaran and 
Smith's (1994) R2, both models fit equally. Parameters associated with log(t) and 10g(O) are 
significantly different fram O at the 0.05 level, but only the parameter values of log O are signif-
icantly different between models. Moreover, the estimated parameter of log O is coherent with 
the assumption that the abatement cost is decreasing in the efficiency parameter. Parameter 
associated to B is significant in Model II only. From these estimates, we can retrieve structural 
40n the.period considered, emission charges designed by local Water Agencies were fairly stable before the 
1992 French Law on Water induced a significant increase in unit emission fees from 1992 to 1996. 
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parameters ao and al with their estimated standard errors. These values imply that the cost 
function is actually increasing in B and 8, and convex in 8. 
For both specifications, we entertain a battery of standard tests presented in Table 3. 
White's test strongly rejects homoscedasticity in both cases, so that standard errors given in 
Table 2 are computed by means of a robust consistent variance-covariance matrix. Hausman's 
test rejects exogeneity of log P ART in Model 1. This may indicate possible misspecification in 
k(·,,) or neglected asymmetric information. In contrast, this test does not reject exogeneity of 
P ART in Model II, so that one may conclude that asymmetric information is not presento We 
also compute apure significance test as suggested by Godfrey (1988) that does not reject either 
of the models at a 5% level; this test may be also interpreted as an overidentifying restriction 
test. Lastly, Pagan and Hall's (198:3) test (with the whole set of instrumental variables) leads 
to confirm the correctness of our specifications. Consequently, we consider our IV estimation 
results as a valid base for subsequent analysis. 
For checking the specification of the Cobb-Douglas cost function, we apply the testing 
procedure detailled in Section 3.3. We compute an individual bandwidth for each variable (i.e. 
log t and log B). The choice of the bandwidth parameters uses the rule-of-thumb h = O. 79¡ n -1/5, 
where ¡ is the interquartile range of the variable, Le. the difference between the 0.75 and the 
0.25 quantiles (see Hardle, 199:3). In order to investigate the sensitivity of the test to the choice 
of the bandwidths, we introduce a multiplicative factor e in the formulae for h, which varies 
from 0.5 to 1.5. The results for this test in Table 4 show that the Cobb-Douglas specification 
is not rejected in either case. The p-values are quite large for Model I, with negative values of 
the test statistics that asymptotically occur only under the null. For Model II, the p-values are 
always superior to 0.2, indicating the non-rejection of our specification. 
Considering now testing for asymmetric information, we apply the procedure detailled 
in Section 3.2. \Ve use a similar method for the choice of the bandwidth parameters, now in-
cluding the variable P ART in addition to log t and log B. We report p-values from both the 
X2 approximation and from the bootstrap procedure based on 200 samples. For Model 1, the 
values of the test statistics are quite large for any choice of the bandwidths, leading to p-values 
that are always less than 0.05. This is in accordance with Hausman's test outcome and clearly 
indica tes that we cannot accept the parametric Model 1 derived under perfect information. For 
Model II, the issue of the testing procedure depends on the chosen bandwidths. For the base case 
where e = 1, the p-value is a mere 7 percent when using the X2 approximation and 12.5 percent 
with the bootstrap procedure. Moreover, as we smooth further, the test rejects the null with 
greater probability. Hence, the conclusions from these nonparametric specification tests differ 
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from what we obtain using standard parametric tests. In particular, Hausman's test does not 
allow to reject the parametric model. In contrast, the outcome of the nonparametric specification 
tests lets us suspect that further investigation is required. In particular, it is worth considering 
the asyrnmetric information assumption within a semiparametric model. 
4.3 Estimation and Testing of the Asymmetric Information Model 
We estimate the econometric model (13) derived under the assumption of asyrnmetric infor-
mation by Robinson's (1988) method. This method requires a bandwidth that asymptotically 
undersmoothes with respect to the theoretical optimal bandwidth in nonparametric regression 
estimation.5 Thus, we choose bandwidth parameters proportional to n-O.3 • Further analysis 
(whose results are not reported) shows that the estimation results are not very sensitive to vari-
ation of these parameters. Table 6 reports our estimation results. The two parameters related to 
log t and log B are significant and their standard errors are not higher than in parametric mod-
eHing. Note that we have taken into account possible heteroscedasticity in their computation as 
suggested by Robinson (1988). For logt, the obtained value is notably below the ones obtained 
in the parametric models, while for log B, we have the reverse effect. Concerning the structural 
parameters, ao has significantly decreased with a similar standard error, while al has a larger 
estimated value than in the parametric estimation. 
We also perform the nonparametric specification tests on the semiparametric model in 
the same way as for the parametric case, see Table 7. When checking for the Cobb-Douglas 
specification, we obtain p-values that are always higher than 0.23, leading to the non-rejection 
of this assumption. The test using all three variables log t, log B and P ART as conditioning 
variables checks for the whole specification of the regression model (see Fan and Li [1996]). We 
obtain results indicating that the semiparametric model is a valid candidate for modelling the 
abatement equation in the asyrnmetric information case. 
For comparing goodness-of-fit in parametric and semiparametric modelling, we compute 
the sum of squared differences between actual and fitted values. Model 1 leads to a value of 
304.57, Model II to a value of 229.18, while the semiparametric model attains a value of 228.80. 
Hence the semiparametric model fits similarly to Model II, while taking into account the adverse 
selection problem. Finally, Figure 2 shows the estimated function g(.) from the semiparametric 
model. It is mostly increasing on its domain, with an exception for extreme low values of PART. 
5This is also a requirement for testing the whole specification of the model as done subsequently, see Fan and 
Li (1996). 
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But, as easily seen, it departs from a simple linear specification. 
These results have important policy implications. First, the coefficient associated with 
log t is the elasticity of abatement with respect to the emission tax. Overestimating this parame-
ter as in the parametric models of perfect information can therefore lead to erroneous conclusions 
in evaluating the effect of a change in the tax level. Second, neglecting possible asymmetric in-
íormation may lead to bias in estimation oí economies oí scale in the cost function. Specifically, 
in our application, the economies of scale are underestimated. The parametric models 1 and 
II lead us to accept with great probability the hypothesis 0:0 = 1, Le. the assumption of con-
stant returns to scale in the abatement activity. In contrast, the semiparametric results reveal 
potential increasing returns to scale. Therefore, while fitting as well as the parametric Model 
II. the semiparametric model allows [or more flexibility in the g(.) function and allows robust 
estimation of the structural parameters. 
5 Conclusion 
As clearly shown in our application, semiparametric methods give us great flexibility in esti-
mating and testing models with possible adverse selection. First, when considering a perfect 
information model, nonparametric testing procedures allow to assess the presence of adverse 
selection, without requiring estimation of the general model by costly numerical methods. More-
over, these procedures can also be used to validate the parametric assumptions of the economic 
model. This point is crucial because one may falsely conclude in favor of asymmetric information 
only because of erroneous assumptions in the economic model. For instance in our application, 
we check the Cobb-Douglas specification of the abatement cost function, that leads us to a 
tractable model. Second, when considering an adverse selection model, semiparametric mod-
elling prevents us from possible misspecification errors related to the type's distribution, while 
allowing estimation of structural parameters that are of central interest for policy analysis. We 
can also check the parametric part of the model by means of consistent testing specification 
procedures as done in the perfect information model. 
As pointed out in the paper, this framework can prove very useful in a wide variety of 
problems where adverse selection can be presento In most applications, practioners must as sume 
that effects of the private information parameter can be disentangled from other effects, in 
order to get a workable model. In this case, our framework is applicable with possibly slight 
adjustments. 
16 
References 
Baron, D.P. (1985) "Regulation of prices and pollution under incomplete information,", Jo.urnal 
o.I Public Eco.no.mícs, 28, pp. 211-23l. 
Baron, D.P. (1989) "Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions," in Handbo.o.k o.I Industrial 
Organizatío.n, ed. by R. Schmalensee and R. Willig, North-Holland, pp. 1347-1448. 
Baumol, W.J. and W.E. Oates (1988) The theo.ry o.I enviro.nmental po.licy, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Chen, J.C. (1994) "Testing for no effect in nonparametric regression via spline smoothing tech-
niques," Annals o.I the Institute o.I Statístical Mathematics, 46(2), pp. 251-265. 
Chiappori, P.A. and B. Salanié (1997) "Empirical contract theory : the case of insurance data," 
Euro.pean Econo.míc Review, 41, 943-950. 
Dalen, D.M. and A. Gomez-Lobo (1997) "Estimating cost functions in regulated industries char-
acterized by asymmetric information," European Econornic Review, 41, 935-942. 
Delgado, M., M. Dominguez and P. Laverglle (1997) "Consistent specification testillg of nonlinear 
econometric models," Universidad Carlos III (work in progress). 
Fan, Y. and Q. Li (1996) "Consistent model specification tests: omitted variables and semipara-
metric functional forms," Econornetrica, 64 (4), pp. 865-890. 
Gasmi, F., J.J. Laffont and W. Sharkey (1997) "Empirical evaluation of regulatory regimes in 
local telecommunications markets," IDEI, Toulouse. 
Godfrey, L.G. (1988) Misspecification tests in econo.metrics, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge. 
Hardle, W. and E. Mammen (1993) "Comparing nonparametric versus parametric regression 
fits," Annals 01 Statistics, 21 (4), pp. 1926-1947. 
Ivaldi, M. and D. Martimort (1994) "Competition under nonlinear pricing," Annales d'Economie 
et de Statistique, 34, pp. 71-114. 
Laffont, J.J. and J. Tirole (1994) A Theory 01 incentives in procurernent and regulation, MIT 
Press, Harvard. 
Laffont, J.J., H. Ossard and Q.H. Vuong (1995) "Econometrics of first-price auctions," Eco.no.-
metrica, 63, pp. 953-980. 
Lavergne, P. and Q. Vuong (1995) "Nonparametric significance testing," INRA-ESR, Toulouse. 
Li, Q. and S. Wang (1995) "A simple consistent bootstrap test for a parametric regression func-
tion," University of Guelph. 
McConnell, V.D. and G.E. Schwarz (1992) "The supply and demand for pollution control: evi-
dence from wastewater treatment," Jo.urnal o.I Enviro.nmental Eco.nomics and Management, 23, pp. 54-77. 
Miravette, E. (1997) "Estimating demand for local telephone service with asymmetric information 
and optional calling plans," INSEAD, Paris. 
17 
Pagan, A.R. and A.D. Hall (1983) "Diagnostic tests as residual analysis," Econometric Reviews, 
2, pp. 159-218. 
Pesaran, M.H. and R.J. Smith (1994) "A generalized R2 criterion for regression models estimated 
by the instrumental variables method," Econometrica, 62(3), 705-710. 
Thomas, A. (1995) "Regulating poIlution under asymmetric information: the case of industrial 
wastewater treatment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 28, pp. 357-373. 
Wolak, F.A. (1994) "An econometric analysis of the asymmetric information regulator-utility 
interaction," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 34, pp. 13-69. 
Xepapadeas, A.P. (1991) "Environmental policy under imperfect information: incentives and 
moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 20, pp. 113-126. 
Zheng, J.X. (1996) "A consistellt test of functional form via nonparametric estimation tech-
niques," Journal of Econometrics, 75, pp. 263-289. 
18 
Appendix. Derivation of the Asymmetric Information Solution 
We present here the resolution of the principal's problem, using standard techniques in the 
literature on regulation under asymmetric information. The interested reader may consult e.g. Baron 
(1989) or Laffont and Tirole (1994) for more details. 
We first consider the condition for truthful revelation of the agent's type, i.e. 
n(e,o)~n(o,O) "10,0 
which is equivalent to an¿O'o) = O. Differentiating profit totally and using condition (8) (Increased Abate-
) . . dn(O,O) ae(o B 6) ment ylelds n = dO =ao'. In our case, we then have 
Because we must have that 8 ~ 8° under regulation, this condition is equivalent to the slope of n being 
higher in absolute value than the slope of nO. Hence, the profit function n( O) is always aboye the status 
quo profit rfJ(O), and both coincide at O = Oc, as shown in Figure 1. The firm with parameter Oc receives a 
zero rent, and the information rent is increasing in the agent's type. Furthermore, firms below Oc are left 
in the status quo case with abatement rate 8°(0). Consequently, Oc is the threshold value defined by the 
equality between Second-Best (asymmetric information) abatement rate and the status quo abatement 
rateo 
Integrating by parts the expectation of profit yields 
re n(B)dF(B) = n(Bc) + re a~bB) (1 _ F(O))dO = nO(oc) - r7i ~~ (1 - F(B))dO. k k k 
Total expected surplus now reads 
1~ {a [W(B8) - C(B, 8, O) - K] + (1 - 2a) ftO) [nO (Be) + (1 - F(B)) ~~] } f(O)dO. 
Maximizing with respect to 6 and using the cost function specification given in (2) yields 
Thus the Second-Best (asymmetric information) solution for the abatement rate is, in logarithmic form 
log(8**) = (al _1)-1 {log(é) + log(t) -log(c) -log(a¡) - j310g(O) 
[ 
2a - 1 1 - F( B) 1] } 
-(ao - 1) 10g(B) -log 1 - (3-a- f(O) O . 
This equilibrium solution under asymmetric information is valid for firms with characteristics in the 
interval [Oc,6]. Thus, Oc is the value of O such that 8** = 6°, i.e. Oc is solution to 
é-l= 
2a - 1 1 - F(Oc) (3 
a f(Oc) Oc· 
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Figure 1. Abaternent rates under status qua, perfect inforrnation, 
and asyrnrnetric inforrnation. 
No regulation Regulation 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (320 observations) 
Variable Mean Sto deviation Minimum Maximum 
8 0.5793 0.3023 0.0024 0.9960 
B 3278.1 9962.1 4.0000 112286 
t 225.4 63.2 91.0097 561.06 
PART 0.5995 0.2996 0.0018 0.9963 
6: abatement rate (m %)j B: gross BlOlogIcal Oxygen Demand (BOD) 
emission level, in kg. per dayj t: BOD emission charge (in French 
Franes); PART: indicator of emissions organicity (in %). 
Table 2: IV Estimation results 
Model I Model II 
Variable Estimate Standard error Estímate Standard error 
Intercept -3.8303 0.8264 -5.6787 0.9178 
logt 0.6500 0.1693 0.6288 0.1619 
10gB 0.0204 0.0337 0.0586 0.0277 
logO 0.7318 0.1267 1.8691 0.2965 
ao 0.9686 0.0832 0.9068 0.0811 
o:} 2.5385 0.2605 2.5904 0.2575 
R2 O.176 R2 O.179 
Model 1: log O lS lmear m log P ART; Model II: log O 18 lmear m P ART. 
Instruments used in both models: logt, log B, COD!, COD2. 
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Table 3: Tests on IV models 
Model I Model II 
Test Statistic P-value Statistic P-value 
White's test (x~o) 68.4788 0.0000 63.7540 0.0000 
Hausman's test (X5) 11.2641 0.0238 5.2925 0.2586 
Pure signo test (xi) 3.3701 0.0664 3.4706 0.0625 
Pagan-Hall's test (Xn 3.4240 0.6349 3.4782 0.6267 
Table 4: Test for parametric specification 
Model I Model II 
e Test statistic P-value Test statistic P-value 
0.50 -0.7798 0.7791 0.5417 0.2917 
0.75 -0.4172 0.6561 0.7866 0.2147 
1.00 -0.4853 0.6831 0.7927 0.2129 
1.25 -0.5252 0.6986 0.7859 0.2150 
1.50 -0.5635 0.7127 0.7004 0.2406 
Table 5: Test for asymmetric information 
Model I Model II 
e Test statistic P-value Test statistic P-value 
X2 app. Bootstrap X2 app. Bootstrap 
0.50 1.9098 0.0401 0.0250 0.6446 0.2563 0.2900 
0.75 3.0455 0.0031 0.0050 1.0553 0.1457 0.2150 
1.00 3.7830 0.0003 0.0000 1.4731 0.0709 0.1250 
1.25 3.9973 0.0001 0.0000 1.8644 0.0313 0.0600 
1.50 4.3703 0.0000 0.0000 2.5049 0.0063 0.0020 
X2 app. refers to p-values based on a centered-rescaled chi-square approximation. 
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Table 6: Semiparametric regression 
Variable Estímate Standard error 
logt 0.5644 0.1640 
10gB 0.0986 0.0231 
ao 0.8253 0.0976 
al 2.7718 0.2907 
Table 7: Tests for the semiparametric model 
Parametric specification Whole specification 
e Test statistic P-value Test statistic P-value 
X2 app. Bootstrap 
0.50 0.6825 0.2442 0.2759 0.3859 0.3550 
0.75 0.7300 0.2304 0.1941 0.4230 0.4400 
1.00 0.5244 0.2960 0.1737 0.4304 0.4850 
1.25 0.4974 0.3057 0.3833 0.3501 0.4000 
1.50 0.4301 0.3298 0.8835 0.1883 0.2100 
X2 app. refers to p-values based on a centered-rescaled chi-square approximation. 
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